Rape by Nonphysical Coercion: State v. Brooks by Hanus, Elizabeth
 
1141 
Rape by Nonphysical Coercion: State v. Brooks 
Elizabeth Hanus* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What is and is not considered rape is far from clear.  For instance, which 
of these threats, if any, are criminal under rape law? 
 “If you don’t have sex with me, I’m going to file for divorce, 
get custody of the kids, and you will never see them again.” 
 “If you don’t have sex with me, I’m going to report you to 
immigration.” 
 “If you don’t have sex with me, I’m going to break up with 
you.” 
Currently, none of these threats would be captured under rape laws in 
many jurisdictions in the United States.
1
  However, based on the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 21-5503 of the Kansas Criminal 
Code in State v. Brooks, a defendant could be guilty of rape if the victim was 
“overcome by fear” due to any of these threats.
2
 
Under section 21-5503, a person is guilty of rape for “[k]nowingly 
engaging in sexual intercourse with a victim who does not consent to the 
sexual intercourse . . . [w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear.”
3
  In 
Brooks, the court held that fear is not limited to fear of physical threats, but 
rather fear is “a highly subjective concept that does not lend itself to 
definition as a matter of law.”
4
  Applying this “highly subjective” standard, 
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 1.  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213.4(1) cmt., at 
70 (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft No. 2, 2015) [hereinafter MPC DRAFT] (“[M]any states 
(possibly the majority) continue to restrict . . . sexual offenses to situations involving threats of 
physical violence.”). 
 2.  See State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 65 (Kan. 2014) (refusing to qualify the term fear and 
holding “whether a victim is overcome by fear . . . is generally a question to be resolved by the 
finder of fact”). 
 3.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 4.  Brooks, 317 P.3d at 63 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Tully, 262 P.3d 314, 331 (Kan. 
2011)). 
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the court affirmed the defendant’s rape conviction, holding that there was 
sufficient evidence that the victim—the defendant’s ex-wife—was overcome 




Although the defendant’s conduct in Brooks was reprehensible—and 
this Comment will argue appropriately criminalized—the highly subjective 
standard is an unsatisfactory way to criminalize rape by nonphysical 
coercion.  This standard, or rather lack of a standard, is too broad and could 
lead to a lack of predictable results and an over-criminalization of conduct.  
In certain circumstances, nonphysical coercion should be criminalized under 
rape law.  The challenge, however, is how the law should define those 
circumstances.  When does a person’s conduct cross the line from 
permissible persuasion, or even a morally suspect but legal threat, to illegal 
coercion that is appropriately criminalized under rape law? 
Drawing from laws in states that criminalize rape by nonphysical 
coercion and approaches suggested by scholars, this Comment proposes a 
blended, incremental approach to criminalizing rape by nonphysical 
coercion.  This approach would criminalize threats that leave a person with 
no reasonable alternative but to engage in the sex act.  Specifically, rape by 
nonphysical coercion would include: (1) context-specific circumstances in 
which there would be a rebuttable presumption that the threatened person 
had no reasonable alternative, and thus, the threat was illegal and (2) a 
general category criminalizing emotional, psychological, intellectual, or 
moral threats
6
 that leave the person no reasonable alternative but to engage 
in the sex act.  This approach would provide Kansas with a more clearly 
defined standard that would lead to more predictable results and better guide 
behavior, as illustrated in Part III of this Comment.  First, however, Part II of 
this Comment provides an overview of rape law and its underlying 
foundations, followed by a discussion of existing and proposed laws 
governing rape by nonphysical coercion and the Brooks case.  Part III 
analyzes the court’s holding in Brooks and alternative approaches presented 
by scholars.  Finally, Part III proposes a blended, incremental approach to 
criminalizing rape by nonphysical coercion, followed by an application and 
discussion of the proposed approach. 
                                                          
 5.  Id. at 65–66. 
 6.  The descriptions of these types of threats are based on the definition of “forcible 
compulsion” as the phrase is used in Pennsylvania’s rape statute.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101, 
3121 (Supp. 2014). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
An overview of the history of rape law and a summary of the current 
law is helpful in understanding where Brooks fits within the broader context 
of rape law.  Part A of this section provides a summary of rape law: its 
history, foundations, and where it stands today.  Part B reviews existing 
laws, or the lack of laws, governing rape by nonphysical coercion, as well as 
proposed alternatives.  Part C discusses the Brooks case. 
A. Rape Laws Generally 
1. History and Foundations of Current Rape Law 
Rape has been a crime for thousands of years, dating back to ancient 
codes and Roman law.
7
  However, until the mid-twentieth century, the crime 
of rape was largely focused on protecting men’s property rights—their 
property being women.
8
  Under Roman law, a rapist was liable to the 
victim’s father, husband, or brother.
9
  Under early English common law, the 
rape of a virgin—more valuable property—was viewed as a more serious 
offense than the rape of a non-virgin.
10
  Aspects of the law continued to 
reflect this focus on protecting male interests well into the twentieth 
century.
11
  Only women could be raped, and a husband could not rape his 
wife.
12




Beginning in the 1970s, American rape law began to undergo a reform 
in response to criticisms by feminists such as Susan Brownmiller, Susan 
                                                          
 7.  Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of 
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1780–81 (1992); see also Katherine K. 
Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 225 (2015) (“The first 
known prohibition on rape appears in Hammurabi’s Code and dates from 1900 B.C.”). 
 8.  See Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 15 
(2015) (“Rape became a crime solely because of male interests in their current or prospective 
spouses.”); Baker, supra note 7, at 225–26 (“Monetary compensation for rape follows logically 
when women are viewed as property because rape causes economic injury to the men who own 
women.”). 
 9.  Dripps, supra note 7, at 1781–82. 
 10.  Id. at 1782. 
 11.  See infra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See Yung, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that pre-reform era rape laws held that rape 
occurred “between a man and a woman who is not his wife”). 
 13.  Id. at 15.  And to meet this utmost-resistance requirement, “victims had to resist a sexual 
assault to their dying breath” or there was no rape.  Id.  
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Griffin, and Catherine MacKinnon.
14
  There were both substantive and 
procedural changes.  Substantively, rape became a gender-neutral crime, the 
resistance requirement was removed from nearly all statutes, and marital 
rape became a crime.
15
  Procedurally, rape-shield laws were enacted and 
corroboration requirements were eliminated.
16
 
Underlying these changes was an evolving understanding of the crime 
of rape.  Rape is no longer seen as a crime against property or a simple 
battery.
17
  Rape is something more.  Today, rape is widely understood as a 
violation of sexual autonomy.
18
  Every person has a right to “choose freely 
whether and when to be sexually intimate with another person.”
19
  However, 
given that sex is a mutual activity, sexual autonomy has inherent limits.
20
  
Having consensual sex with another person depends on the other person also 
exercising control over their autonomy and choosing to have sex.  In other 
words, sexual autonomy has both a negative dimension—freedom from 
unwanted sex—and a positive dimension—freedom to pursue a sexual 
relationship that is mutually desired.
21
  Rape, then, is a violation of the 
negative dimension of sexual autonomy.
22
 
In addition to autonomy, Professor Corey Rayburn Yung outlines three 
other justifications for treating rape as a distinct crime: harm, gender, and 
terror.
23
  Rape is unique in terms of both the type and severity of harm it 
causes.
24
  Rape is more than just a physical attack.
25
  Compared to victims of 
                                                          
 14.  See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE 
FAILURE OF LAW 25, 29–30 (1998) [hereinafter SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX]. 
 15.  Yung, supra note 8, at 15. 
 16.  SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 14, at 33.  Rape-shield laws limit the scope of 
cross-examination of the victim regarding his or her prior sexual relationships.  Id. at 30.  Under 
corroboration requirements that were previously in place, convictions were barred “unless 
independent witnesses or physical evidence corroborated the victim’s testimony.”  Id. at 18. 
 17.  See Yung, supra note 8, at 20–21 (describing the “greater and different harm” caused by 
rape as opposed to “ordinary batteries”); see also Dripps, supra note 7, at 1783 (explaining the shift 
of viewing rape as a crime violating a man’s possession of a woman—i.e., a property crime—to a 
crime that violates sexual autonomy). 
 18.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70; see also Baker, supra note 7, at 228 
(“Overriding the victim’s will that she not be touched in that particular area by that particular person 
constitutes the gravamen of rape.  It is that act of disregarding her will that violates women’s sexual 
autonomy.”). 
 19.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, general commentary, at 16. 
 20.  Yung, supra note 8, at 28. 
 21.  Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rape-Law Reform Circa June 2002: Has the Pendulum Swung Too 
Far?, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 276, 277 (2003).  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Yung, supra note 8, at 20. 
 24.  Id. at 20–22. 
 25.  Id. at 20. 
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other violent crimes, rape victims are significantly more likely to suffer 
physiologically and psychologically from the rape.
26
  Even today, rape 




Although rape is now a gender-neutral crime from the perspective of the 
law, it continues to be closely interwoven with gender dynamics.
28
  Rape 
victims are primarily women and most perpetrators are men.  Based on the 
National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, between 1995 and 2010, 91% of all recorded rape or sexual 
assault victimizations involved female victims.
29
  Whereas in 2014, men 
comprised 97% of the arrests for rape according to the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports.
30
  Understanding rape as a crime of gendered violence and 
reflective of broader social misogyny provides an additional foundation for 
treating rape as a distinct crime.
31
 
Finally, rape is different from many other crimes given its broader effect 
of creating an “atmosphere of terror.”
32
  While it is not possible to determine 
an exact number of individuals that experience sexual assault, various 
studies have found that as many as one in five female college students in the 
U.S. experience sexual assault.
33
  Even while acknowledging that the 
                                                          
 26.  Id. at 21; see also Carlo Faravelli et al., Psychopathology After Rape, 161 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1483, 1483–84 (2004) (finding women who were raped were significantly more likely 
to suffer from PTSD and major depression compared to victims of other life-threatening traumas 
such as violent robberies and physical assaults); Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of 
the Impact of Sexual Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 225, 
225–26 (2009) (citing numerous studies reflecting the high prevalence of negative, mental-health 
conditions suffered by women with a history of sexual assault). 
 27.  See Yung, supra note 8, at 21–22 (discussing the isolating impact of social sanctions, such 
as victim blaming, on rape victims). 
 28.  Id. at 25; see also Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons Learned 
from the Real World in Thinking About the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 353, 
359 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1223_pr5jmv1i.pdf (“Despite the gender-neutral 
language in most modern rape statutes, it is true that the vast majority of rape victims are women and 
the vast majority of perpetrators of forcible rape are men.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 29.  MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
1994–2010 3 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf.  “In 2010, the male rate of 
rape or sexual assault was 0.1 per 1,000 males compared to a rate of 2.1 per 1,000 females.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  
 30.  See Ten-Year Arrest Trends, THE FBI , https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-33 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (reporting 9,757 total 
rape offenses charged, with 9,449 committed by male perpetrators versus 308 committed by female 
perpetrators). 
 31.  Yung, supra note 8, at 25. 
 32.  Id. at 26 (describing studies and anecdotal accounts that demonstrate the ways in which the 
fear of rape affects individuals’ day-to-day decisions). 
 33.  Scott Jaschik, 1 in 5 After All?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 15, 2015), 
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statistic is limited to females in college, that sexual assault is broader than 
rape, and that the studies may overstate (or understate) the actual percentage 
due to various methodological factors, the number is striking.  These types 
of statistics indicate that the fear of rape or sexual assault affects a much 




Understanding the history and foundations of rape law helps to not only 
provide for a more comprehensive understanding of current rape law, but 
also helps to inform and contribute to the ongoing development of the law.  
For, despite the gains from reforms over the last forty years, rape law 
continues to be a unique area of the law where many problems persist.
35
  For 
example, despite changes in their respective laws, a comprehensive study of 
Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, D.C. 
showed that there was no increase in conviction rates.
36
  Consistent with 
this, there was also little change in the way police officers, prosecutors, and 
judges approached rape cases.
37
  Thus, despite the progress made, there 
continues to be a need for further reform. 
2. Current Rape Law 
Under current rape law there are either three (sex act, non-consent, and 
force) or two (sex act and non-consent) elements.
38
  Before summarizing 
rape laws across the U.S., however, a caveat is necessary.  Given the 
variation in rape laws across states, and in many instances a lack of case law 
interpreting the statutes, an initial statutory survey can be misleading.
39
  For 
                                                          
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/15/new-survey-finds-1-5-college-women-have-
experienced-sexual-assault. 
 34.  Yung, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
 35.  See id. at 38–39, 42 (discussing current problems in rape law such as the high prevalence of 
sexual violence in the U.S. and the failure of law enforcement and prosecutors to enforce rape and 
sexual assault laws). 
 36.  SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 14, at 38.  In the study, “[t]he researchers 
concluded that the impact of reform, in all six jurisdictions, was ‘minimal.’”  Id. (citing Cassia 
Spohn & Julia Horney, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the Processing of Simple and 
Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 861, 863 (1996)).  
 37.  Id.  For example, even if the new statute did not include a resistance requirement, police, 
prosecutors, and judges still considered whether a victim resisted to be important.  Id. 
 38.  See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-
Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1083–86 (2011) (describing classification of different state laws based on the 
elements included in the statutes). 
 39.  See MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.1(2) cmt., at 36–37 (describing the challenges in 
conducting a statutory survey of existing rape law across all states); see also Decker & Baroni, supra 
note 38, at 1084 (classifying states based on the elements in each states’ rape laws and including a 
 
2016] RAPE BY NONPHYSICAL COERCION 1147 
 
example, some states appear not to include a force element.
40
  Non-consent, 
however, is then defined by showing forcible compulsion or an incapacity to 
consent.
41
  In addition, some states do not require a showing of force for 
sexual contact offenses, but require force for sexual penetration offenses.
42
  
As a result, the summary that follows is approximate. 
Rape law can be divided between states that include a force requirement 
and states that do not.
43
  Slightly less than half of states do not require 
force.
44
  In these states, sexual penetration without consent is a felony.
45
  
However, the definitions of consent or lack of consent vary across 
jurisdictions.
46
  Some states define consent in an affirmative manner, with 
the absence of consent being a lack of positive cooperation.
47
  Other states 
define consent in the negative, with non-consent being an expression, which 
can be verbal or nonverbal, indicating unwillingness or lack of consent.
48
  In 
addition, many states recognize certain situations in which an individual may 
be unable to consent due to factors such as mental incapacity or 
                                                          
category for “contradictory non-consent states” that appear not to include a force element but define 
non-consent by a showing of forcible compulsion or an incapacity to consent). 
 40.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1085; MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.1(2) cmt., at 
36. 
 41.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1085.  For example, Alaska’s sexual assault statutes do 
not appear to include a force element.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2007) (“An offender 
commits the crime of sexual assault in the first degree if (1) the offender engages in sexual 
penetration with another person without consent of that person . . . .”).  Without consent, however, is 
then defined to mean that a person “(A) with or without resisting, is coerced by the use of force 
against a person or property, or by the express or implied threat of death, imminent physical injury, 
or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone; or (B) is incapacitated as a result of an act of the 
defendant.”  Id. § 11.41.470(8) (2007) (emphasis added). 
 42.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1087.  Minnesota’s fifth-degree, sexual-conduct statute, 
for example, states that: “‘A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree if the 
person engages in non-consensual sexual contact.’  Conversely, all of Minnesota’s other sex 
offenses, including penetration offenses, require a showing of force, threat of force, coercion, or 
deception.”  Id. (footnotes omitted); see also MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341–.3451 (2009 & Supp. 2014). 
 43.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1084. 
 44.  See id. (classifying twenty-eight states as “true non-consent states,” but noting that only 
seventeen of these states have non-consent provisions for sexual-penetration offenses); see also 
MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 44 (“At present 17 states provide a felony 
punishment for sexual penetration on the basis of lack of consent alone, without requiring added 
showings of coercion, force, deception, or other special situations and without defining ‘nonconsent’ 
in such a way as to require force or high levels of resistance.”). 
 45.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 44. 
 46.  See id. § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 44–45 (discussing various consent definitions); see also 
Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1084–1101 (discussing non-consent and consent-based state 
laws). 
 47.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 44; see also Decker & Baroni, supra note 
38, at 1088–90 (discussing different statutory definitions of consent). 
 48.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 44–45; Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, 
at 1088–90. 





In the slight majority of states that include force as an element in sexual-
penetration offenses, there is also substantial variation in the definition of 
force—both in terms of the amount and type of force required.
50
  Eight states 
require significant physical force.
51
  For example, first-degree, forcible rape 
in North Carolina requires that the offender employ or display “a dangerous 
or deadly weapon” or inflict “serious personal injury upon the victim or 
another person.”
52
  Others states require only a minimal showing of force 
extrinsic to the sex act—i.e., some amount of force beyond the force 
inherent in the act of nonconsensual sex.
53
  Some states have also expanded 
force to include constructive or implied force, including threats of physical 




Finally, there is variation as to what sex acts constitute rape.  Although 
all states include vaginal penetration by a penis, whether penetration by 
other body parts or objects is included or if anal or oral sex is included varies 
across states.
55
  Thus, despite the commonality of the elements across 
different jurisdictions, there is considerable variation in what constitutes 
rape. 
                                                          
 49.  For example, in Kansas, the definition of rape includes: 
Knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim is incapable of 
giving consent because of mental deficiency or disease, or when the victim is incapable 
of giving consent because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other 
substance, which condition was known by the offender or was reasonably apparent to the 
offender . . . . 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(2) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). 
 50.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.1(2) cmt., at 36. 
 51.  Id. § 213.1(2) cmt., at 37 n.86.  These states include: “Maine, Montana, North Carolina, 
Iowa, South Carolina, Texas, Indiana, and Louisiana.”  Id. 
 52.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.21(a)(1)–(2) (2000). 
 53.  See MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.1(2) cmt., at 37–38 (discussing states’ force 
requirements). 
 54.  Id. § 213.1(2) cmt., at 38–39. 
 55.  For example, in Kansas, sexual intercourse, as used in the rape statute, is defined as: “any 
penetration of the female sex organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 21-5501(a), -5503 (2008 & Supp. 2015).  Sodomy is defined as: “oral contact or oral penetration 
of the female genitalia or oral contact of the male genitalia; anal penetration . . . of a male or female 
by any body part or object . . . .”  Id. § 21-5501(b).  Although sodomy is separately criminalized in 
section 21-5504, the language and classification of the level of the offense is generally similar to the 
rape statute.  Compare id. § 21-5503, with id. § 21-5504.  
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B. Rape by Nonphysical Coercion 
1. Current Laws 
This variation continues when examining the narrower category of rape 
by nonphysical coercion.
56
  The first major distinction between jurisdictions 
is whether rape by nonphysical coercion is criminalized.
57
  Many states do 
not criminalize rape by nonphysical coercion and restrict rape to situations 
involving violence or threats of physical violence.
58
  However, the 
legislatures in several states have broadened the scope of their statutes to 
include rape by nonphysical coercion.
59
  Within these states, the legislatures 
vary in categorizing and grading the offense.  Some states incorporate 
nonphysical coercion into existing rape statutes, whereas others create new 
offenses that carry lighter penalties than rape.
60
 
There is also variation as to specifically what type of conduct constitutes 
criminal nonphysical coercion.  Though no two statutes are identical, the 
following common definitional approaches emerge when analyzing existing 
statutes: (1) inclusion or exclusion of an objective or reasonable-person 
standard; (2) either using broad, typically undefined terms such as coercion 
or extortion, or enumerating behaviors constituting unlawful conduct; and 
                                                          
 56.  See Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1120–22 (dividing the eighteen states that include 
some type of non-physical threat in their rape statutes into three categories: (1) “Threat of Use of 
Force Against Property;” (2) “Extortion, Intimidation, Public Humiliation, or Undefined 
‘Coercion;’” and (3) “Comprehensive Statutes”); see also MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) 
cmt., at 70–71 (discussing variations). 
 57.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1119–20; MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., 
at 70–71. 
 58.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70. 
 59.  Id. § 213.1(2) cmt., at 39.  As noted in the commentary to the draft MPC:  
A handful of states go beyond physical force or domination to penalize forms of coercion 
that are purely psychological or exploitive in nature.  Formulations along these lines 
include statutes that penalize intercourse obtained by: 
 “extortion,” “intimidation,” or “coercion” 
 “threats of public humiliation or intimidation” 
 threats to accuse the victim or any other person of a crime 
 threats to “expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 
tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule.” 
 “a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of public humiliation, 
property damage, or financial loss.” 
 “use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force, either 
express or implied.” 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  See also Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1120–22 (discussing states with 
non-physical-coercion statutes); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. 
L. REV. 39, 119–25 (1998) [hereinafter Falk, Rape] (discussing non-physical coercion). 
 60.  See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
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(3) criminalizing sexual activity, including activity due to nonphysical 
coercion, in certain contexts where one person holds a position of trust or 
power, such as teachers or psychotherapists.
61
 
For example, Pennsylvania includes nonphysical coercion in its rape 
statute using relatively broad terms.  In Pennsylvania, rape includes 
engaging in sexual intercourse with a person by “forcible compulsion” or by 
“threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of 
reasonable resolution.”
62
  Forcible compulsion is defined as “[c]ompulsion 
by use of physical, intellectual, moral, emotional or psychological force, 
either express or implied.”
63
  For threats of forcible compulsion, an objective 
standard is added by requiring that the threat would “prevent resistance by a 
person of reasonable resolution.”
64
 
On the contrary, Delaware has a separate offense of sexual extortion—a 
class E felony punishable by up to five years in prison.
65
  A person is guilty 
of sexual extortion if the person causes another person to engage in a sex act 
by threatening to do any of the following: 
(1) Cause physical injury to anyone; 
(2) Cause damage to property; 
(3) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; 
(4) Accuse anyone of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted 
against anyone; 
(5) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, 
intending to subject anyone to hatred, contempt or ridicule; 
(6) Falsely testify or provide information or withhold testimony or 
information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or 
(7) Perform any other act which is calculated to harm another person 
materially with respect to the other person’s health, safety, business, 
calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal 
                                                          
 61.  See infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text; see also Falk, Rape, supra note 59, at 79–84 
(discussing rape-by-coercion cases involving situations “in which a defendant uses an authoritative 
position or manipulates a power relationship to achieve sexual compliance”). 
 62.  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a) (Supp. 2014). 
 63.  Id. § 3101 (Supp. 2014). 
 64.  Id. § 3121(a)(2). 
 65.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 774, 4205 (2006 & Supp. 2016). 





In comparison, first-degree rape in Delaware—a class A felony 
punishable by a minimum of fifteen years and up to a maximum of life in 
prison—includes sexual intercourse without the victim’s consent if “the 
person causes physical injury or serious mental or emotional injury to the 
victim” during the commission of the crime.
67
  Though the rape statute 
includes serious mental or emotional injury, the sexual-extortion statute’s 
more expansive list of nonphysical threats is not included in the more 
harshly penalized crime of rape. 
2. Lack of Enforcement of Current Laws 
Although states vary considerably as to how, if at all, rape by 
nonphysical coercion is criminalized, there is one area where states are 
largely consistent—the lack of case law involving rape by nonphysical 
coercion.
68
  Even states that criminalize this type of conduct lack case law 
on the topic.
69
  And the majority of the limited case law that does exist 
consists of cases that involve minors or include threats of force.
70
  Various 
factors likely contribute to the under-enforcement of rape-by-nonphysical 
coercion laws. 
Professors John F. Decker and Peter G. Baroni note that the lack of case 
law suggests that: (1) states are not prosecuting these offenses; (2) 
                                                          
 66.  Id. § 774.  All the impermissible threats included in Delaware’s sexual-extortion statute are 
also included in Delaware’s extortion statute, which is also a class E felony.  Id. §§ 774, 846.  Under 
Delaware’s extortion statute, a person is guilty of extortion if the person causes another person to 
deliver property to them by threatening one of the enumerated acts.  Id. § 846.  In addition to its 
general extortion statute, Delaware also criminalizes coercion—a class A misdemeanor publishable 
by up to one year in prison.  Id. §§ 791, 4296.  A person is guilty of coercion if the person causes 
another person to “engage in conduct which the victim has a legal right to abstain from in engaging 
in” by threatening one of the enumerated acts.  Id. § 791. 
 67.  Id. §§ 773, 4205 (emphasis added). 
 68.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1122–23. 
 69.  Id.   
 70.  Id.; see, e.g., Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 672 (Va. 1985) (affirming rape 
conviction where defendant raped his fifteen-year-old, physically handicapped niece by threatening 
to return her to her physically abusive father); State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 146 (Iowa 2011) 
(affirming third-degree sexual abuse conviction where defendant had sex with his teenage 
stepdaughter while she was in a “very vulnerable psychological state . . . due to her crack cocaine 
addiction, her estrangement from her mother, and her need for support and shelter”); Sabol v. 
Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 533, 537–38 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing rape conviction where 
defendant had sex with his stepdaughter by threatening to have her prosecuted for taking money out 
of her mother’s bank account without permission, but affirming rape conviction where defendant 
pushed her down a hallway to a bedroom where he raped her). 
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defendants are being prosecuted, but acquitted; or (3) defendants are being 
convicted, but opting not to appeal.
71
  While possible, it seems unlikely that 
large numbers of defendants are being convicted and not appealing.
72
  More 
likely, the lack of case law reflects a lack of prosecutions, or it reflects 
prosecutions but a lack of convictions.
73
 
The lack of either prosecutions or convictions may be a function of 
multiple factors.  Professors Decker and Baroni point to the lack of clarity in 
the existing laws.
74
  “Without a clear definition of the parameters of a law, 
courts and prosecutors cannot adequately enforce it.”
75
  The lack of clearly 
defined terms in statutes, coupled with limited case law, results in ambiguity 
as to just what behavior is criminal.  Professors Decker and Baroni also note 
that when states criminalize nonphysical coercion as a low-level 
misdemeanor, the legislatures signal that they are not taking rape by 
nonphysical coercion as seriously as rape involving physical force.
76
 
The lack of enforcement of rape by nonphysical coercion laws is also 
likely part of the broader under-enforcement of all rape law.  As noted by 
Professor Yung when discussing rape generally, “rape is incredibly 
underreported, reported rapes are not regularly investigated, arrests in rape 
cases are rare, prosecutors are loath to take rape cases that might jeopardize 
their high conviction rates, and convictions at trial are less likely than in 
other crimes.”
77
  This lack of enforcement may be amplified when 
criminalizing a broader scope of conduct such as rape by nonphysical 
coercion. 
Similarly, expanding the scope of rape laws too far beyond generally 
accepted social norms of what constitutes rape may actually reinforce 
existing norms and result in less enforcement.
78
  Professor Dan M. Kahan 
                                                          
 71.  Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1125. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Yung, supra note 8, at 42. 
 78.  Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000).  In introducing the “sticky norms” problem, Professor Dan M. Kahan 
notes the following:  
To change the behavior of men (and women) who have internalized the norm that “no 
sometimes means yes,” some states have modified their rape laws either to dispense with 
the common law element of force or to eliminate the “reasonable mistake of fact” defense 
with respect to consent.  Empirical studies suggest, however, that such reforms have little 
effect on juries, which continue to treat verbal resistance as equivocal evidence of 
nonconsent, or on prosecutors, who remain reluctant to press charges unless the victim 
physically resisted the man’s advances. 
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describes this generally as the “sticky norms problem.”
79
  “This problem 
occurs when the prevalence of a social norm makes decision[-]makers 
reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that norm.”
80
  When the law 
condemns a behavior significantly more severely than the typical decision 
maker—police officers, prosecutors, judges, and juries—this is a “hard 
shove.”
81
  As a result, “the decision[-]maker’s personal aversion to 
condemning too severely will dominate her inclination to enforce the law, 
and she will balk.”
82
  Certain rape-by-nonphysical-coercion statutes, 
particularly those that criminalize rape by nonphysical coercion equally with 
rape involving physical force, may have represented “hard shoves” when 
they were enacted and may continue to be “hard shoves” today. 
In contrast, when the law is a “gentle nudge” and only goes slightly 
beyond the typical decision-maker’s norms, the decision-maker will be more 
likely to enforce the law as “her desire to discharge her civic duties will 
override her reluctance to condemn.”
83
  Further, enforcement by decision-
makers results in a feedback effect of social influence—as people perceive 
similarly situated people behaving in the same way, they are more likely to 
behave in that way as well.
84
 
All of these factors—lack of clarity in laws that criminalize nonphysical 
coercion, overall under-enforcement of rape laws, and existing rape by 
nonphysical coercion laws potentially representing “hard shoves”—likely 
contribute to the current status of rape by nonphysical coercion laws.  
Understanding these factors and analyzing current laws can help to inform 
efforts to effectively reform existing laws and establish new laws. 
3. Proposed Alternatives 
In response to the existing but ineffective rape-by-nonphysical-coercion 
                                                          
Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 608. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 615.  The feedback effects of social influence can either reinforce or diminish the 
likelihood of a specific behavior.  Behaviors are reinforced when “a relatively large group of like-
situated persons are engaging in a certain form of behavior,” making it more likely others will also 
engage in the behavior, which then has the effect of increasing the overall size of the group and so 
on.  Id.  Behaviors are diminished “when an individual perceives that the group of individuals 
engaging in a behavior is relatively small,” making it less likely a person will engage in the 
behavior, which then has the effect of reducing the overall size of the group and so on.  Id. at 615–
16. 
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statutes in some states and the lack of statutes in other states, scholars have 
presented several alternatives.  These alternatives include: (1) expanding 
existing extortion statutes to include sex acts;
85
 (2) creating new rape-by-
nonphysical-coercion statutes modeled after existing extortion statutes;
86
 (3) 
incorporating contract-law principles—including duress, undue influence, 
and unconscionability—into rape statutes;
87
 and (4) distinguishing between 




a. Expand Existing Extortion Statutes 
Professor Donald A. Dripps proposes a commodity theory to understand 
rape—in which sex or sexual cooperation is a commodity and rape is the 
theft of that commodity.
89
  Theft of sex occurs when sex is taken as a result 
of physical violence as well as in situations where sex is taken as a result of 
“pressures to cause sexual cooperation, short of violence”—the latter being 
“sexual expropriation.”
90
  While both would be criminal, sexual 
expropriation would carry lighter penalties than theft of sex involving 
physical violence.
91
  Specifically, Professor Dripps notes that “[sexual] 
[e]xtortion can be covered simply by amending the extortion statutes to 




                                                          
 85.  See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 7, at 1802. 
 86.  See, e.g., MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a) cmt., at 75. 
 87.  See, e.g., Ann T. Spence, Note, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to 
Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57, 57 (2003). 
 88.  See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 14, at 119–21 (discussing the 
difference between threats and offers, both legally and philosophically). 
 89.  See Dripps, supra note 7, at 1786 (“According to the commodity theory, sexual cooperation 
is a service much like any other, which individuals have a right to offer for compensation, or not, as 
they choose.”). 
 90.  See id. at 1799–1800 (arguing that under “a rational criminal law of sex” nonviolent, 
coercive pressures to cause sexual cooperation should be punished, but not as harshly as situations 
that involve physical violence). 
 91.  Id.  Specifically, Professor Dripps includes a model statute under which “Sexually 
Motivated Assault” would carry the same sentence as aggravated assault, “Aggravated Sexually 
Motivated Assault” would carry the same sentence as rape, and “Sexual Expropriation” would be 
“punishable by a maximum prison sentence of one year and one day.”  Id. at 1807. 
 92.  Id. at 1802. 
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b. Create New Rape by Nonphysical Coercion Statutes Based on 
Extortion Statutes 
Similarly, the drafters of the proposed revisions to the Model Penal 
Code (MPC) on sexual assault and related offenses look to existing extortion 
and coercion statutes to define rape by nonphysical coercion.
93
  The draft 
MPC, however, goes beyond expanding existing extortion statutes to include 
sex.  Rather, section 214.3 creates two new crimes: sexual penetration by 
coercion and sexual penetration by exploitation.
94
  Sexual penetration by 
coercion specifies contexts in which affirmative consent is deemed coerced 
and ineffective because it was obtained using nonviolent but impermissible 
means.
95
  Specifically, an individual is guilty of sexual penetration by 




[An individual] engages in an act of sexual penetration with another person 
and 
 
 (a) obtains that person’s consent by threatening to: 
(i) accuse anyone of a criminal offense or of a failure to comply 
with immigration regulations; or 
(ii) expose any information tending to impair the credit or business 
repute of any person; or 
(iii) take or withhold action in an official capacity, whether public 
or private, or cause another person to take or withhold action in an 
official capacity, whether public or private; or 
                                                          
 93.  See MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a) cmt., at 75 (“Section 213.4(1)(a) . . . adopts as 
the criteria for impermissible coercion the tests that have long been the measure of illegality in 
connection with monetary demands.”).  The American Law Institute is in the process of updating 
Article 213 of the Model Penal Code—Sexual Assault and Related Offenses.  MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES xv (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014) 
[hereinafter MPC TENTATIVE DRAFT], http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02-
Article_120/20140807/03_ProposedRevision_MPC213_Excerpt_201405.pdf.  The comprehensive 
revision project, which includes completely rewriting Article 213, began in 2012 and is ongoing.  Id.  
As noted by the reporters preparing the updated provisions: “The social, cultural, and legal changes 
that have occurred since the [American Law] Institute’s approval of the 1962 Code have rendered its 
provisions outdated, and they have been the subject of extensive scholarly criticism.”  MPC DRAFT, 
supra note 1, introductory note, at 24.  As a result, the drafts include significant changes, such as the 
addition of section 213.4—Sexual Penetration by Coercion or Exploitation.  See id. § 213.4, at 69–
70.  Though the drafts incorporate changes based on criticisms of the 1962 Code, the drafts have also 
been subject to criticism.  See infra notes 222–23 and accompanying text. 
 94.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4, at 69–70. 
 95.  Id. § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70. 
 96.  Id. § 213.4(1), at 69; MPC TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 93, at xviii. 
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(iv) inflict any substantial economic or financial harm that would 
not benefit the actor[.]
97 
Sexual penetration by exploitation—a fourth-degree felony punishable 
by up to five years in prison
98
—criminalizes sexual penetration in certain 
circumstances even if there is no threat.
99
  A discussion of this offense is 
outside the scope of this Comment, but given the similarities with sexual 
penetration by coercion, a brief summary is warranted.  Under section 
214.3(2), sexual penetration is prohibited between: (1) a mental-health 
professional and a current patient or (2) an attorney and a client, if the 
attorney is representing the client in a domestic-relations or criminal 
matter.
100
  In addition, sexual penetration is criminalized in the following 
instances of deception: (1) falsely representing that the act is a medically 
necessary treatment or (2) falsely causing the other person to believe that 
“he or she is someone with whom such person has been sexually intimate”
101
 
(e.g., “when the imposter is an identical twin,
 
when the victim is half-asleep 
in a darkened room,
 
or when the victim, unclothed and in bed, is approached 
by the imposter from behind”
102
). 
                                                          
 97.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1), at 69. 
 98.  Id. § 213.4(2), at 69; MPC TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 93, at xviii. 
 99.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(2) cmt., at 86.  Specifically, sexual penetration by 
exploitation is defined as follows:  
An actor is guilty of Sexual Penetration by Exploitation . . . if he or she knowingly or 
recklessly engages in an act of sexual penetration with another person and the actor:  
  (a) is engaged in providing professional treatment, assessment, or counseling for a 
mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition of such person over a period 
concurrent with or substantially contemporaneous with the time when the act of sexual 
penetration occurs, regardless of the location where such act of sexual penetration occurs 
and regardless of whether the actor is formally licensed to provide such treatment; or  
  (b) is a lawyer who is representing the other person in a domestic-relations matter or is 
representing the other person as a defense attorney in a criminal matter, the sexual 
penetration occurs during the course of the representation, and a consensual sexual 
relationship between the parties did not predate the lawyer–client relationship; or  
  (c) represents that the act of sexual penetration is for purposes of medical treatment or 
that such person is in danger of physical injury or illness which the act of sexual 
penetration may serve to mitigate or prevent; or 
  (d) knowingly leads such person to believe falsely that he or she is someone with 
whom such person has been sexually intimate.  
Id. § 213.4(2), at 69–70. 
 100.  Id. § 213.4(2)(a)–(b), at 69. 
 101.  Id. § 213.4(2)(c)–(d), at 69–70. 
 102.  Id. § 213.4(2) cmt., at 107 (footnotes omitted). 
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c. Apply Contract Doctrines to Rape Law 
Ann T. Spence takes a different approach—using the contract doctrines 
of duress, undue influence, and unconscionability to expand the definition of 
force in rape and criminalize nonphysical coercion.
103
  Spence notes: “[J]ust 
as there is no bright-line rule that distinguishes between contracts and 
unlawfully coerced agreements, there is no bright-line rule that distinguishes 
between sex and rape.”
104
  She argues, however, that contract doctrines can 




In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a contract is voidable due to 
duress “[i]f a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper 
threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.”
106
  
The improper threat can be legal in nature—such as threatening a crime or 
tort—or economic in nature.
107
  However, in order to constitute duress, the 
threat must leave the victim with no reasonable alternative.
108
 
A contract can also be voidable due to undue influence.
109
  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines undue influence in part as “unfair 
persuasion of a party who is under the domination of the person exercising 
the persuasion.”
110
  Spence acknowledges that the concept of undue 
influence is implicitly recognized in statutes that prohibit sexual activity 
between an individual who is in a position of authority over another.
111
  
“Position-of-authority” statutes, however, often specify certain relationships, 
rather than more broadly define the power imbalance.
112
 
Finally, a court may refuse to enforce a contract if it was unconscionable 
when the parties entered into it.
113
  In evaluating whether a contract is 
unconscionable, courts consider if there was an imbalance in bargaining 
                                                          
 103.  Spence, supra note 87, at 57. 
 104.  Id. at 72. 
 105.  Id. at 60. 
 106.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
 107.  Spence, supra note 87, at 80; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 
(describing when a threat is improper). 
 108.  Spence, supra note 87, at 80. 
 109.  Id. at 84. 
 110.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177(1). 
 111.  Spence, supra note 87, at 84. 
 112.  Id.  The term position-of-authority statute is used by Professors Decker and Baroni.  
Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1126–27.  Almost all states have some type of position-of-
authority statute.  Id. at 1127. 
 113.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208. 
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power that was taken advantage of to create an unfair agreement.
114
  Spence 
proposes that the unconscionability principle could similarly be applied in 
rape cases “to prevent oppression.”
115
 
d. Distinguish Between Lawful Offers and Unlawful Threats 
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer distinguishes between an offer—”a 
proposal that contemplates making the person better off, in return for her 
taking the action requested”—and a threat—”a proposal to make a person 
worse off than she has a right to be.”
116
  The critical premise is that every 
person is entitled to a “set of rights and expectations.”
117
  A threat is 
impermissible and coercive because “it proposes to take away from [a 
person] something [she is] rightfully entitled to claim.”
118
 
Professor Schulhofer acknowledges that a person’s specific scope of 
rights are not only ambiguously defined but subject to change.
119
  He argues, 
however, this framework is beneficial in analyzing the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of different pressures.
120
 
C. State v. Brooks 
In Brooks, the Kansas Supreme Court took an approach different from 
any of the existing statutes and proposed alternatives.  Under section 21-
5503(a)(1)(A) rape is defined as “[k]nowingly engaging in sexual 
intercourse with a victim who does not consent to the sexual intercourse . . . 
[w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear.”
121
  In Brooks, the court held 
that “or fear” does not just include fear of force, but rather “fear within the 
definition of rape is a highly subjective concept that does not lend itself to 
definition as a matter of law.”
122
  In this case, the defendant was guilty of 
                                                          
 114.  Spence, supra note 87, at 88. 
 115.  Id. at 88–89 (quoting Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and 
Gender in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 894 (1997)). 
 116.  SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 14, at 120. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See id. at 120–24 (applying the proposed framework to determine that a boyfriend telling 
his girlfriend that he will break up with her unless they have sex is not a threat as “the young man’s 
demand for sex in the dating situation would not take from his girlfriend any right she is—or should 
be—entitled to hold”). 
 121.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 122.  State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 63 (Kan. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Tully, 262 
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rape when the victim was overcome by fear due to threats to expose the 
victim’s affair with a married coworker.
123
 
1. The Facts 
George James Brooks, III (“Brooks”) and J.P. were married for nearly 
ten years before they separated in May 2005 and divorced ten months 
later.
124
  Several months following their divorce, Brooks called J.P. to tell 
her that he had copies of emails between J.P. and her married coworker 
showing that the two had an affair.
125
  Brooks informed J.P. that “he would 
be coming over to her house for sex that evening.”
126
 
Brooks arrived at J.P.’s house that evening with the copies of the emails 
and threatened to give them to her employer and her coworker’s wife unless 
she had sex with him.
127
  After putting their young daughter to bed, J.P. tried 
to reason with Brooks, reminding him that what he was doing was wrong 
and they were divorced.
128
  She made clear to Brooks that she did not want 
to have sex with him, saying: “I don’t want to do this. . . .  This is against my 
will.”
129




Brooks then told J.P. to take off her underwear, and when she hesitated, 
he became agitated.
131
  J.P. complied and Brooks proceeded to have sex with 
J.P. while she sat in a chair with her eyes closed and hands over her face.
132
  
After Brooks was done, he informed J.P. that this had been a “test” and he 
would back on Friday.
133
 
The following day, J.P. told her attorney and her counselor what had 
happened and they encouraged her to tell the police.
134
  The police gave J.P. 
a recorder, and J.P. taped several calls with Brooks during which he 
demanded money and sex.
135
  J.P. arranged to meet with Brooks on May 
                                                          
P.3d 314, 331 (Kan. 2011)).   
 123.  See id. at 56. 
 124.  State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d 317 P.3d 54 (Kan. 2014). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1192–93 (Hill, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 1193. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1180 (majority opinion). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 




  When Brooks arrived at J.P.’s house, the police arrested him.
137
 
2. The Trial and Kansas Court of Appeals Opinions 
A jury found Brooks guilty of one count of rape, two counts of 
blackmail, and one count of breach of privacy.
138
  The court sentenced him 
to consecutive sentences of 155 months for the rape conviction and 12 
months for each blackmail conviction, totaling 179 months in prison.
139
 
Specifically, the jury found Brooks guilty of rape for engaging in 
“[s]exual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual 
intercourse . . . [w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear .”
140
  During 
the trial, J.P. testified that the sex was nonconsensual, and she only had sex 
with Brooks because he threatened to expose the affair with her coworker.
141
  
J.P. did not think Brooks would physically hurt her if she refused, but she 
believed he would follow through with his threat.
142
  While J.P. did not 
believe she would be fired or suffer direct adverse employment 
consequences as a result of the affair being exposed, she believed it would 
taint the workplace environment.
143
 
Brooks appealed the rape and breach of privacy convictions.
144
  With 
considerable reluctance, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed these 
convictions.
145
  The court noted that while the punishment for blackmail 
convictions “seems entirely too lenient when the victim has been coerced to 
submit to a violation of her bodily integrity and to a particular act that when 
                                                          
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 1180–81. 
 139.  Id. at 1181.  Brooks was also sentenced to 12 months on the breach-of-privacy conviction, 
to run concurrently.  Id. 
 140.  Id.  At the time of the case, Kansas’s rape statute was codified in section 21-3502.  Id.  In 
2011, section 21-3502 was repealed and replaced with section 21-5503, Kansas’s current rape 
statute.  See H.R. 2339, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011).  There were not, however, any substantive 
changes to the relevant portion of the statute.  Compare Brooks, 265 P.3d at 1181 (quoting the then-
applicable rape statute), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2015). 
 141.  Brooks, 265 P.3d at 1180. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 1179.  Brooks did not appeal the blackmail convictions.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 1192.  In reversing the rape and breach of privacy convictions, the court stated: 
When it comes to statutory law, the judiciary must apply what the legislative branch has 
adopted and what the executive branch has approved and then enforces.  In this case, we 
believe we have faithfully adhered to that duty.  But we are dismayed at the result, 
particularly with respect to the rape charge. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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compelled constitutes nothing less than defilement,” Brooks’s conduct did 
not fit the statutory definition of rape.
146
 
In interpreting “fear” in the rape statute, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
first held that the use of “force or fear” in the statute constitutes a single 
means of committing rape.
147
  As a result, the evidence only needs to support 
the victim being overcome by either force or fear, not both.
148
  However, 
because “force or fear” constitutes a single means of committing rape, the 
court then held that there must be some commonality between the type of 
force and type of fear contemplated in the statute.
149
  Thus, the court held 
fear as used in the rape statute means “fear resulting from the use or threat to 
use force against the victim, another person, or property.”
150
 
The court acknowledged that J.P.’s fear of having the affair exposed and 
being subject to scorn, ridicule, and embarrassment constituted a legitimate 
and rational emotional fear and was an invasion of J.P.’s privacy with a 
potentially substantial impact.
151
  However, due to likely an “inadvertent 
omission” by the legislature, this type of fear did not constitute the type of 
fear included in the rape statute.
152




In concluding its opinion, the Kansas Court of Appeals called upon the 
legislature to provide a solution going forward,
154
 noting that: “The outcome 
leaves J.P. without a full measure of justice for what Brooks did to her in 
this case.  And the people of this state have neither adequate penal sanctions 
to invoke in the next case nor sufficient deterrent punishments to prevent 
                                                          
 146.  Id. at 1182.  The court also emphasized that while Brooks’s conduct clearly fit the 
blackmail statute, it is unlikely the legislature anticipated situations like the one in this case when 
adopting the blackmail statute.  Id.  The court noted the relatively lenient punishment under the 
blackmail statute as support for this belief.  Id.  “Blackmail is a severity level 7 nonperson felony.  
As felonies go, that is comparatively mild.  For a defendant without any significant criminal history, 
as Brooks, the guidelines punishment would be 11 to 13 months in prison but with a presumption of 
probation rather than incarceration.”  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 1184.  The court explained “force or fear” could either indicate a single means of 
committing rape—like the court held—or alterative means.  Id. at 1182. 
 148.  Id. at 1182.  Conversely, for alterative means crimes, if “the prosecution declines to elect 
one or the other, resulting in a jury instruction on both, the evidence must be sufficient to support 
each.”  Id. 
 149.  See id. at 1184 (explaining if there was no connection between the two words, “force and 
fear would amount to alternative means of committing rape”). 
 150.  See State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 63 (Kan. 2014) (summarizing the interpretation of fear 
by the Kansas Court of Appeals). 
 151.  Brooks, 265 P.3d at 1186. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 1192. 
 154.  See id. at 1186, 1192 (explaining that the result commanded by the statute may have been a 
drafting error instead of a policy choice, and finding fault with the Kansas Criminal Code). 
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what would be the case after that.”
155
 
3. The Kansas Supreme Court Opinion 
In 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court provided a solution, reversing the 
Kansas Court of Appeals and affirming Brooks’s rape conviction.
156
  The 
Kansas Supreme Court agreed that force or fear is a single means of 
committing rape.
157
  The terms describing the elements of a single-means 
crime, however, do not need to have interconnected definitions.
158
  Rather, 
the terms can have significantly different meanings.
159
  Fear could have a 




Without the constraint of needing a commonality between fear and 
force, the court analyzed the rape statute, emphasizing that if the intent of 
the legislature can be ascertained, the intent governs.
161
  If the plain text of a 
statute is clear and unambiguous, the court should not use cannons of 
statutory construction or look to legislative history to try to determine an 
underlying intent.
162
  Instead, the court should apply ordinary meanings of 




The court contrasted the plain text of section 21-3502—”force or 
fear”—with Pennsylvania’s rape statute, which specifically qualifies the type 
of threat, requiring intercourse “‘by forcible compulsion’ or ‘threat of 
forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable 
resolution.’”
164
  The Kansas statute does not qualify the type of fear 




                                                          
 155.  Id. at 1192. 
 156.  State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 67 (Kan. 2014). 
 157.  Id. at 56. 
 158.  See id. at 64–65 (“Our recent alternative means caselaw [sic] clearly shows that the 
legislature can use terms with vastly different meanings to describe a single material element or 
factual circumstance that would prove the crime.”).  
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See id. 
 161.  Id. at 63–65. 
 162.  Id. at 63.  
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. at 64 (quoting State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1270 (Kan. 1994)); see also 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3121 (Supp. 2014). 
 165.  See Brooks, 317 P.3d at 64 (noting that the court of appeals had read language into the 
statute, violating well-known rules of statutory interpretation). 
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Referring to its analysis in State v. Tully
166
 and State v. Borthwick,
167
 the 
court explained that “fear within the definition of rape is a highly subjective 
concept that does not lend itself to a definition as a matter of law.”
168
  Thus, 
as long as the victim testifies that he or she was overcome by fear and the 
“testimony is not ‘so incredible as to defy belief,’” the fact finder should 
determine whether the overcome-by-fear element is met.
169
  The jury, 
however, can consider the reasonableness of the fear when determining 
whether to believe the testimony.
170
 
Reviewing the evidence presented at trial, the court held that there was 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Brooks guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt on the basis that J.P. was overcome by fear.
171
  In addition 
to her testimony, J.P.’s actions of covering her face and closing her eyes 
while Brooks had sex with her supported the inference that J.P. was 
overcome by fear.
172
  As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the 




III.  ANALYSIS 
In its outcome-motivated analysis, the Kansas Supreme Court failed to 
provide a clear standard that can be applied going forward.  Brooks’s 
conduct was reprehensible and appropriately criminalized.  However, the 
standard, or rather lack of a standard, that fear is “highly subjective”
174
 and 
as long as the victim’s testimony is not “‘so incredible as to defy belief,’ 
there is sufficient evidence to present the ultimate determination to the 
factfinder”
175
 could lead to a lack of predictable results and an over-
criminalization of conduct. 
Part A of this section analyzes the court’s interpretation of section 21-
5503, focusing on why the highly subjective standard is problematic.  Part B 
                                                          
 166.  State v. Tully, 262 P.3d 314 (Kan. 2011).  See infra note 180 for a summary of the Tully 
case. 
 167.  State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261 (Kan. 1994).  See infra note 180 for a summary of the 
Borthwick case. 
 168.  Brooks, 317 P.3d at 63 (emphasis added) (quoting Tully, 262 P.3d at 331). 
 169.  Id. at 64 (quoting Borthwick, 880 P.2d at 1271, 1279). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. at 66. 
 172.  Id. at 65–66. 
 173.  Id. at 67. 
 174.  Id. at 63 (quoting State v. Tully, 262 P.3d 314, 331 (Kan. 2011)). 
 175.  Id. at 64 (quoting State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1279 (Kan. 1994)). 
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argues nonphysical coercion should be criminalized in certain 
circumstances, but other existing statutes and proposed alternatives are also 
problematic.  Part C outlines and applies an alternative based on a blended, 
incremental approach to better strike the balance between criminalizing 
impermissible coercion, while also recognizing the existence permissible 
persuasion. 
A. The Unworkable Standard of State v. Brooks 
While this Comment focuses on why the highly subjective standard is 
problematic—regardless of whether the Kansas Supreme Court correctly 
interpreted section 21-5503—a brief analysis of the court’s statutory 
interpretation is warranted.  Part 1 of this section discusses the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s analysis of section 21-5503, followed by Part 2, which 
analyzes the resulting highly subjective standard. 
1. Statutory Analysis 
Under the statutory interpretation framework outlined by the Kansas 
Supreme Court, if the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the 
court should not use cannons of statutory construction or look to legislative 
history to determine an underlying intent.
176
  Consistent with this approach, 
the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the plain text of section 21-5503 
is clear and unambiguous, so therefore, further statutory interpretation was 
unnecessary.
177
  Further, the Kansas Supreme Court “refuse[d] to qualify the 
term fear and instead note[d] that fear is an inherently subjective concept 
because . . . ‘[w]hat renders one person immobilized by fear may not 
frighten another at all.’”
178
 
Whether the plain text of the statute is clear and unambiguous is 
debatable.  If the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, one might 
expect other cases similar to Brooks to have been brought under the statute.  
The “force or fear” language has been in the statute since 1969.
179
  However, 
neither the Kansas Court of Appeals nor the Kansas Supreme Court cited to 
another case where a defendant was convicted for rape when the victim was 
overcome by fear due to threats even remotely similar to those made by 
                                                          
 176.  Id.  
 177.  See id. at 64–65 (holding that fear is highly subjective based on the statute’s plain language 
and without looking to the legislative history). 
 178.  Id. at 65 (quoting Borthwick, 880 P.2d at 1270). 
 179.  See infra notes 181–84 and accompanying text. 





Assuming, however, that the plain text is ambiguous, there is little 
legislative history to assist in interpreting the force or fear language.  The 
language was added in 1969 as part of a comprehensive update to Kansas’s 
criminal law.
181
  The existing 1929 rape statute—defining rape as “carnally 
and unlawfully knowing any female person under the age of eighteen years” 
or “forcibly ravishing any female person”—was replaced with section 21-
3501.
182
  Section 21-3501 defined rape as: “[T]he act of sexual intercourse 
committed by a man with a woman not his wife, and without her consent . . . 
[w]hen a woman’s resistance is overcome by force or fear . . . .”
183
  The 
legislature made several subsequent amendments—including removing the 
marital exemption and resistance requirement and making it gender-
neutral—but “force or fear” has remained.
184
 
Ultimately, irrespective of whether the court correctly interpreted the 
statute, legislative reform is needed.  Assuming the Kansas Supreme Court 
did not correctly interpret the statute, and the better interpretation was that of 
the Kansas Court of Appeals: fear is limited to “fear resulting from the use 
or threat to use force against the victim, another person, or property,”
185
 
legislative reform is needed to expand the definition to criminalize 
                                                          
 180.  Instead, the Kansas Supreme Court primarily referred to Tully and Borthwick.  See Brooks, 
317 P.3d at 65.  Both of these cases are easily distinguished from Brooks.  In Tully, the defendant, 
who was nineteen years old, was charged with raping A.C., who was fourteen years old and 
intoxicated.  State v. Tully, 262 P.3d 314, 320 (Kan. 2011).  The court ultimately reversed the 
convictions due to several procedural errors and remanded the case.  Id.  In reviewing the jury 
instructions, the court explained that “force or fear within the definition of rape is a highly subjective 
concept” and “the question of whether a victim is overcome is one of fact for the jury to decide.”  Id. 
at 331.  The court ultimately held that the district court’s jury instructions omitted key language on 
the element of force and were potentially confusing.  Id. at 332.  In Borthwick, the defendant was 
convicted of raping J.C., who had spastic hemiplegia cerebral palsy and could not walk without 
assistance or stand without support.  Borthwick, 880 P.2d at 1264.  The defendant laid J.C. down on 
the floor and, despite her repeatedly asking him to stop, digitally penetrated J.C.  Id.  “J.C. testified 
that she was afraid . . . and that she felt powerless to stop [the assault].”  Id. at 1269.  The court 
discussed fear as well as force, and ultimately “conclude[d] that a rational factfinder could have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was nonconsensual and that the 
victim was overcome by force or fear.”  Id. at 1271. 
 181.  See KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL BULLETIN, PROPOSED KANSAS CRIMINAL CODE 6–8 
(1968) (noting the objectives of the criminal law revisions, including “conform[ing] the law to the 
accepted standards and concepts of modern penal legislation” and “stat[ing] in clear, simple and 
understandable terms the elements of the prohibited acts”). 
 182.  See H.B. 172, 43rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 272 (Kan. 1929); S.B. 9, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 456 
(Kan. 1969). 
 183.  S.B. 9, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess., 456. 
 184.  Compare id., with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (Supp. 2015). 
 185.  Brooks, 317 P.3d at 64 (summarizing the interpretation of fear by the Kansas Court of 
Appeals). 
1166 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
nonphysical coercion in certain circumstances.
186
  Similarly, if the Kansas 
Supreme Court correctly interpreted the statute, legislative reform is needed 
to clarify and narrow the circumstances in which nonphysical coercion is 
criminalized.  The highly subjective standard set forth in Brooks is too broad 
and could lead to a lack of predictable results and an over-criminalization of 
conduct. 
2. An Unworkable Standard 
Consider the possibilities of behavior that could be criminal under the 
highly subjective standard if the victim was overcome by fear as a result of 
the threat.  As noted in the commentary to the draft of the revised MPC on 
sexual assault and related offenses: 
The range of potentially troublesome incentives and threats used 
to induce sexual submission is almost impossibly broad and varied: a 
police officer’s threat to arrest or offer not to make a justifiable arrest; a 
job supervisor’s intention to fire an employee, block a promotion, or 
expedite an undeserved promotion; a threat to expose another person’s 
adultery, embezzlement, irregular immigration status, or sexual 
orientation; a wealthy person’s threat to stop supporting a paramour; a 
person’s threat to break off a dating relationship—the list is endless, 
and the criteria for distinguishing between legitimate exchange and 
impermissible compulsion are by no means uniformly agreed upon.
187
 
Under the “highly subjective” standard, a defendant could be guilty of 
rape if the victim was overcome by fear due to any of these threats.  
Provided the victim’s testimony is “not ‘so incredible as to defy belief,’” it 
would ultimately be left to the fact finder to determine whether the victim 
was overcome by fear.
188
 
“The reasonableness of a particular victim’s fear may affect the jury’s 
assessment of the victim’s credibility in arriving at its verdict.”
189
  However, 
under Brooks, provided the jury believes the victim was overcome by fear, a 
defendant could be guilty of rape regardless of how objectively reasonable 
the fear was or was not.  Some of these examples may be extreme, such as 
an individual’s threat to end a dating relationship.  Perhaps the fact finder 
would not believe a victim was overcome by fear due this type of threat, but 
                                                          
 186.  See supra Part III.C.I for a discussion of the circumstances in which nonphysical coercion 
should be criminalized under rape law. 
 187.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70. 
 188.  Brooks, 317 P.3d at 64 (quoting State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261, 1279 (Kan. 1994)). 
 189.  Id. 
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at what point does a person become overcome by fear?  Can a person be 
overcome by fear from a threat to file for divorce and sue for child custody?  
Should idiosyncratic fears—that the threat-maker may or may not know 
of—be included?
190
  In Brooks, the Kansas Supreme Court notes that 
“[w]hat renders one person immobilized by fear may not frighten another at 
all.”
191
  The highly subjective standard places no boundaries as to what type 
of threats could be criminal. 
Further, the Brooks standard provides little guidance for the fact finder 
to determine at what point someone is overcome by fear.  In her dissent, 
Justice Moritz agrees that J.P. feared that Brooks would expose the affair, 
but disagrees with the majority’s holding that there was sufficient evidence 
that J.P. was overcome by fear.
192
  Justice Moritz equates being “overcome 
by fear” with being “immobilized or paralyzed” by fear.
193
  In his dissent, 




However, as noted by the majority, in their arguments, “i.e., how a rape 
victim should act, both of the dissents take on the role of a jury, weighing 
the evidence and passing on the credibility of J.P., something that is clearly 
improper on appellate review.”
195
  The majority then concludes there was 
sufficient evidence that J.P. was overcome by fear—”i.e., her fear got the 
better of her; her fear affected or influenced her so strongly as to make her 
physically helpless; her fear overpowered, conquered, and subdued her.”
196
 
Defining how a rape victim “should” act would be unwise.  Numerous 
studies show the responses of rape victims are varied.
197
  However, as 
demonstrated by the majority opinion and both dissents in Brooks, this 
question inevitably arises when examining the facts to determine if there was 
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim was overcome by 
fear. 
                                                          
 190.  This point is noted by Justice Johnson in his dissent in Brooks: “[M]aking the overcome-
by-fear element a purely subjective determination, such that a defendant might not have known of 
the existence or degree of his sexual partner’s phobia(s), could raise due process concerns.”  Id. at 67 
(Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 191.  Id. at 64 (majority opinion) (quoting Borthwick, 880 P.2d at 1277). 
 192.  Id. at 68 (Moritz, J., dissenting). 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  See id. at 67–68 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 195.  Id. at 66–67 (majority opinion). 
 196.  Id. at 67 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1607 (1993)). 
 197.  See generally PATRICIA L. FANFLIK, NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, VICTIM RESPONSES 
TO SEXUAL ASSAULT: COUNTERINTUITIVE OR SIMPLY ADAPTIVE? (2007), 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/pub_victim_responses_sexual_assault.pdf (discussing victims’ varying 
reactions to rape). 
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Ignoring for a moment the question of whether any, some, or all of the 
types of threats described at the beginning of this section should be 
criminalized, and if so, what the punishment should be, the Brooks highly 
subjective standard remains problematic.  Rape is a seriously-punished 
crime.  In Kansas, rape when the victim is overcome by force or fear is a 
level one person felony.
198
  Thus, a defendant with no prior criminal history 
convicted of rape would be subject to between 147 (mitigated sentence) and 
165 (aggregated sentence) months in prison under Kansas’s sentencing 
guidelines.
199
  The sentencing court would have discretion in assigning the 
sentence within the range, with the grid listing a standard sentence of 155 
months.
200
  Thus, not only does the highly subjective standard fail to provide 
a predictable standard as to when behavior would or would not be criminal, 
but if it is criminal, the punishment is severe. 
B. Criminalizing Rape by Nonphysical Coercion and Analyzing Existing 
Alternatives 
An analysis of Brooks, however, cannot ignore the question of whether 
nonphysical coercion should be criminalized.  Part 1 of this section argues 
rape by nonphysical coercion should be criminalized in certain 
circumstances, but as discussed in Part 2, similar to the highly subjective 
standard, existing alternatives also present their own drawbacks. 
1. Criminalizing Rape by Nonphysical Coercion 
Legislatures, courts, and commentators will inevitably disagree over 
whether and to what extent certain behaviors should be criminal.
201
  
Generally, however, many commentators agree nonphysical coercion should 
                                                          
 198.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(b). 
 199.  Id. § 21-6804(a).  Kansas’s sentencing guidelines grid takes into account both the severity 
of the crime (vertical axis) and the criminal history of the defendant (horizontal axis).  Id. § 21-
6804(a), (c).  Crime severity ranges from level one to ten, and criminal history ranges from one 
misdemeanor or no criminal history to three or more person felonies.  Id.  For each combination of 
severity level and criminal history, the grid provides a sentencing range.  Although the court has 
discretion to sentence anywhere in the range, the statute recommends using the center of the range in 
the usual case.  Id. § 21-6408(e)(1). 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  For example, there was disagreement at both levels of appellate review in Brooks.  At the 
Kansas Court of Appeals, Judge Hill authored a dissenting opinion.  State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 
1192 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (Hill, J., dissenting), rev’d 317 P.3d 54 (Kan. 2014).  At the Kansas 
Supreme Court, two justices authored separate dissenting opinions.  State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 
67–68 (Kan. 2014) (Johnson, J., dissenting); id. at 68 (Moritz, J., dissenting). 
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be criminalized in at least certain circumstances.
202
  As noted in the 
commentary to the draft MPC, “American law has long since moved beyond 
the uniform view in the early 20th century that physical harm and threats of 
violence [are] the only impermissible means to secure submission to a sexual 
demand.”
203
  This view is also consistent with the underlying fundamental 




The right to “choose freely whether and when to be sexually intimate 
with another person”
205
 should include more than just freedom from 
unwanted physically forced sex.  Numerous other areas of the law recognize 
intrusions on autonomy beyond just physical force.  Extortion or blackmail 
statutes under criminal law define impermissible threats in connection with 
monetary demands.
206
  In contract law, contacts are voidable when they are a 
result of impermissible nonphysical coercion and violate an individual’s 
autonomy under the doctrines of duress, undue influence, and 
unconscionability.
207
  Intrusions on an individual’s sexual autonomy should 
similarly be recognized as unlawful and penalized as such. 
Further, the fundamentals of sexual autonomy, harm, gender, and terror 
continue to apply to when considering rape by nonphysical coercion.  In 
particular, social sanctions—one of the factors making the harm of rape 
unique—may be worse for a victim of rape by nonphysical coercion.  Rape 
victims are already treated differently from victims of other crimes.
208
  The 
likelihood of being asked why you put yourself in a certain situation or why 
you were in a certain part of town is lower when you are reporting your 
wallet being stolen than being raped.
209
  When considering rape by 
nonphysical coercion, the question of “why did you not just say no and 
                                                          
 202.  See, e.g., Falk, Rape, supra note 59, at 47 (“[T]he critical question is no longer if rape law 
should prohibit sexual conduct secured by fraud or coercion, but rather when (or under what 
circumstances) such behavior merits criminal sanction.”); Dripps, supra note 7, at 1799 (“The 
second, and far more difficult, step toward a rational criminal law of sex would be to define and 
grade those pressures to cause sexual cooperation, short of violence, that deserve to be punished as 
crimes.”); Decker & Baroni, supra note 38, at 1168 (“Coercion in any form or taking advantage of 
one’s position of authority to achieve sex must be outlawed everywhere.”). 
 203.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70. 
 204.  See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
 205.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, introductory note, at 16. 
 206.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (criminalizing theft 
by extortion if a person “purposely obtains property of another by threatening” one of seven 
enumerated items). 
 207.  See Spence, supra note 87, at 57; see also supra notes 103–15 and accompanying text. 
 208.  Yung, supra note 8, at 21–22. 
 209.  See id.  
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refuse” will surely be asked.  The victim will then be forced to explain why 
he or she did not “just say no and refuse”—a question that would less likely 
be asked when someone has been raped by physical force. 
A lack of physical force or threats of force should not make 
nonconsensual sex legal.  Nonphysical coercion should be criminalized in 
certain circumstances.  The challenge, however, is defining those certain 
circumstances. 
2. Existing Alternatives and Other Proposed Approaches 
As discussed in Part.III.A.2, the highly subjective standard of Brooks 
leaves Kansas with a poorly defined standard that will lead to unpredictable 
results.  Further, neither the approaches taken in other states that criminalize 
rape by nonphysical coercion
210
 nor the alternatives suggested by scholars
211
 
offer independent solutions. 
A key similarity across all the approaches taken in states that criminalize 
rape by nonphysical coercion is the lack of case law.
212
  This probably 
reflects either a lack of prosecutions or prosecutions but a lack of 
convictions.
213
  As discussed in Part II.B.1, the lack of effective enforcement 
is likely a function of multiple factors—lack of clarity in the laws of states 
that criminalize nonphysical coercion, overall under-enforcement of rape 
laws, and existing rape by nonphysical coercion laws potentially 
representing “hard shoves.”
214
  While the overall under-enforcement of rape 
laws goes beyond just rape by nonphysical coercion laws, the other two 
explanations can be specifically taken into account when analyzing how to 
best define the circumstances in which nonphysical coercion should be 
illegal.  The existing laws can also provide examples—both of what not to 
do as well as approaches that may be beneficial. 
Just as some of the existing laws provide models for determining how 
best to set the parameters of rape by nonphysical coercion, so do the 
alternatives suggested by scholars.  In leveraging the alternatives in defining 
a new approach, however, it is important to consider both the benefits and 
drawbacks of the various approaches. 
Professor Dripps offers a simple approach of “amending the extortion 
statutes to include sex among the things it is criminal to obtain by unlawful 
                                                          
 210.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 211.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 212.  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 214.  See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. 




  However, as noted by Professor Patricia J. Falk, it “makes no 
provision for the unique harm endemic to sexual offenses.”
216
  Like 
including rape under a battery statute, simply expanding the scope of 
extortion statutes fails to recognize the fundamental values for treating rape 
as distinct crime.  As aptly noted by the Kansas Court of Appeals, the 
punishment under the blackmail convictions—12 months for each 
conviction—”seems entirely too lenient when the victim has been coerced to 
submit to a violation of her bodily integrity and to a particular act that when 
compelled constitutes nothing less than defilement.”
217
 
The sexual penetration by coercion offense in the draft MPC on sexual 
assault and related offenses provides a useful starting point, but it is both 
under- and over-inclusive.  By narrowly defining the circumstances in which 
a threat is impermissibly coercive to threats to: (1) accuse someone of a 
crime or failure to comply with immigration regulations; (2) expose 
information to impair a person’s credit or business reputation; (3) “take or 
withhold an action in an official capacity”;
218
 or (4) “inflict any substantial 
economic or financial harm”
219
 a large portion of reprehensible behavior will 
remain legal. 
Specifically, the drafters noted that expanding the second type of threats 
listed to include the following italicized language could be defended: 
“[T]hreats to expose ‘any information, not intrinsic to or arising out of 
interaction between the actor and such other person, which would tend to 
subject any person to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to impair the credit or 
business repute of any person.’”
220
  The drafters, however, opted for the 
narrower approach—excluding the italicized language—because (1) the 
narrower approach already goes significantly beyond the circumstances in 
which most states currently criminalize sexual offenses; “(2) the potentially 
broad scope and vague content of criteria such as hatred, contempt, and 
ridicule in this context; and (3) the general preference for parsimony in 
situations where the need for criminal sanctions is unclear.”
221
 
The narrower language selected by the drafters, however, also has the 
potential to be broad and over-inclusive.
222
  As noted in the May 12, 2015 
                                                          
 215.  Dripps, supra note 7, at 1802. 
 216.  Falk, Rape, supra note 59, at 174. 
 217.  State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1182 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d 317 P.3d 54 (Kan. 2014). 
 218.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a)(iii), at 69. 
 219.  Id. § 213.4(1)(a)(iv), at 69.  
 220.  Id. § 213.4(1)(a) cmt., at 79–80. 
 221.  Id. § 213.4(1)(a) cmt., at 80. 
 222.  The expansive scope of the proposed revised Article 213 and the potential for a broad over-
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memorandum signed by numerous American Law Institute members, “[t]he 
draft has no de minimis threshold for a ‘threat’ that is criminalized so long as 
the complainant claims that the ‘threat’ was the cause of the consent to 
sexual intercourse, thereby nullifying the coerced consent.”
223
  For example, 
under section 213.4(1)(a)(ii)—the “narrower” language—threats to “expose 
any information tending to impair the credit or business repute of any 
person” are criminalized.
224
  This language is not qualified like section 
213.4(1)(a)(iv), which criminalizes threats to “inflict any substantial 
economic or financial harm.”
225
  Under section 213.4(1)(a)(ii), if J.P. owned 
her own business and exposure of the affair would “tend to impair [her] . . . 




Further, linking the coerciveness of a threat to other criminal offenses 
has the potential to result in odd outcomes.  For example, in Kansas, 
adultery is a criminal offense.
227
  Under section 21-5511, it is class C 
misdemeanor to engage in “sexual intercourse . . . with a person who is not 
married to the offender if . . . [t]he offender is married . . . .”
228
  Thus, at 
least in Kansas, Brooks’s conduct would be considered sexual penetration by 
coercion.  However, in another state that does not criminalize adultery, 
Brooks’s conduct would not be captured under the statute.  The drafters even 
acknowledged this result,
229
 but offered no solution to address this outcome.  
Should whether an individual has committed sexual penetration by coercion 
turn on whether the state criminalizes adultery? 
                                                          
criminalization of conduct are key critiques of the drafts.  See Memorandum from Undersigned ALI 
Members and Advisers on Revisions to Sexual Assault Provisions of the Model Penal Code 1 (May 
12, 2015), http://downloads.mensactivism.org/ALIMemo20150512.pdf. 
 223.  Id. at 6.  The memorandum provides the following hypothetical: 
Suppose that Person A “threatens” to vote for the contestant not preferred by Person B, 
the sex partner of Person A, during the viewer voting phase of the television show 
“American Idol.”  Six months later, Person B files a criminal complaint alleging that this 
“threat” was the means by which Person A “obtains consent” to sexual intercourse with 
Person B.  Person A is guilty of a ten-year felony because of this “threat” to “cause 
another person [the recorder of “American Idol” votes] to take or withhold action in an 
official capacity, whether public or private.”  Yes, that is an absurd result but this model 
statute intended for promulgation to the states invites this result as well as many others 
that would work to over[-]criminalize and over[-]incarcerate. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 224.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a)(ii), at 69 (emphasis added). 
 225.  Id. § 213.4(1)(a)(iv), at 69 (emphasis added). 
 226.  See id. § 213.4(1)(a)(ii), at 69. 
 227.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5511 (Supp. 2015). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 80 n.247. 
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Finally, Spence’s proposal of using contract law doctrines to expand the 
definition of force in rape and criminalize nonphysical coercion,
230
 as well 
as Professor Schulhofer’s focus on distinguishing between lawful offers and 
unlawful threats,
231
 are both helpful in understanding and thinking about 
how to define when nonphysical coercion is criminal.  Neither, however, 
clearly explains how to translate those approaches into specific statutory 
language. 
C. Creating a Better Approach 
There is not a single correct approach to criminalizing rape by 
nonphysical coercion.  Ultimately, however, “[t]he law must choose, from 
among empirically imperfect standards, the one best able to guide behavior 
and minimize the cost of inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness.”
232
  In 
defining a specific standard, it important to consider the advantages and 
disadvantages of potential approaches, analyze trade-offs offered by 
different options, and be aware of social norms implicitly reflected in any 
standard.  Part 1 of this section describes an alternative to criminalizing rape 
by nonphysical coercion based on a blended, incremental approach to better 
strike the balance between criminalizing impermissible coercion, while 
recognizing the existence permissible persuasion.  Part 2 illustrates how the 
approach would apply in different circumstances.  Finally, Part 3 reflects on 
the advantages of the proposed approach, while also considering potential 
shortcomings. 
1. Defining a Blended, Incremental Approach 
This Comment proposes a blended, incremental approach to 
criminalizing rape by nonphysical coercion.  The approach is blended 
because it draws from alternatives proposed by scholars and approaches 
taken by states that criminalize nonphysical coercion.  The approach is 
incremental as does not criminalize all nonphysical coercion and grades rape 
by nonphysical coercion as a lesser offense than rape involving force.  As a 
result, it hopefully represents a “gentle nudge” towards condemning this 
type of behavior rather than a “hard shove.”
233
 
Specifically, this Comment proposes criminalizing rape by nonphysical 
                                                          
 230.  See supra notes 103–12 and accompanying text. 
 231.  See supra notes 116–20 and accompanying text. 
 232.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 47. 
 233.  See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text regarding “gentle nudge” and “hard shove.” 
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coercion when the threat leaves the person with no reasonable alternative but 
to engage in the sex act.  This would be effected by: (1) enumerating 
context-specific circumstances in which there would a rebuttable 
presumption that the threatened person had no reasonable alternative, and 
thus, the threat was illegal and coercive and (2) including a general category 
criminalizing emotional, psychological, intellectual, or moral threats
234
 that 
leave the person no reasonable alternative. 
Section 213.4(1)—sexual penetration by coercion—in the draft MPC 
provides a potential list of context-specific circumstances in which there 
would be a rebuttable presumption that the threat was illegal and coercive.  
Specifically, the following threats would be included: 
(i) accuse anyone of . . . a failure to comply with immigration 
regulations; or (ii) expose any information tending to [substantially] impair 
the credit or business repute of any person; or (iii) take or withhold action in 
an official capacity, whether public or private, or cause another person to 
take or withhold action in an official capacity, whether public or private; or 
(iv) inflict any substantial economic or financial harm that would not benefit 
the actor . . . .
235
 
Unlike section 213.4(1)(a) of the draft MPC, however, threats in these 
circumstances would only create a rebuttable presumption that the threat was 
illegal and coercive.  As discussed in Part III.B.2, the draft MPC provisions 
have the potential to be over-inclusive.  If a person “obtained consent” by 
threatening one of the enumerated items, his or her conduct would be 
criminal under the statute.  Under the approach proposed by this Comment, 
threatening one of the items would create a rebuttable presumption that the 
threatened person was left with no reasonable alternative, and thus, the threat 
was criminal, but it would not be conclusive.  It would require further 
inquiry into whether the individual was left with no reasonable alternative. 
Further, there are two modifications to the language from the draft 
MPC.  First, threats to accuse anyone of a criminal offense are excluded.  As 
discussed in Part III.B.2, including these types of threats has the potential to 
result in odd outcomes, such as whether an individual has committed sexual 
penetration by coercion depending on whether the state criminalizes 
adultery.
236
  Second, threats to expose information tending to impair a 
person’s credit or business reputation are limited to threats tending to 
                                                          
 234.  The descriptions of these types of threats are based on the definition of “forcible 
compulsion” as the phrase is used in Pennsylvania’s rape statute.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101, 
3121 (Supp. 2014). 
 235.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a), at 69. 
 236.  See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text. 
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substantially impair a person’s credit or business reputation.  This addition 
may be unnecessary given that threats would only be considered illegal 
when they leave the threatened person with no reasonable alternative.  
However, including substantially would help emphasize that the threat must 
be material. 
Identifying specific circumstances where it is more likely the threat is 
illegal and coercive helps more clearly define the parameters of when a 
threat is impermissibly coercive.  However, limiting criminalization to only 
those circumstances increases the likelihood the law will be under-inclusive.  
To address this possibility, the law should include a general category 
criminalizing emotional, psychological, intellectual, or moral threats
237
 that 
cause a person to engage in the sex act if the threat left the person no 
reasonable alternative. 
Requiring that the threat left the person with no reasonable alternative 
draws from the contract law doctrine of duress.
238
  Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, a contract is voidable due to duress “[i]f a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party 
that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.”
239
  As noted by Spence, 
contract law “incorporates both objective and subjective measures of the 
threat.”
240
  Likewise, whether the emotional, psychological, intellectual, or 
moral threat left the person with no reasonable alternative should be 
considered from both a subjective and objective perspective. 
Finally, rape by nonphysical coercion due to a threat under one of the 
context-specific circumstances or threats under the general category should 
be graded less severely than rape involving physical force, but significantly 
more harshly than blackmail or extortion.  The lesser grading is not meant to 
trivialize the experience of rape by nonphysical coercion,
241
 but rather 
recognizes that expanding the scope of rape as proposed would be a 
significant change for many jurisdictions and attempts to make the change 
                                                          
 237.  The descriptions of the types of threats noted are based on the definition of “forcible 
compulsion” as used in Pennsylvania’s rape statute.  See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3101, 3121. 
 238.  See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 239.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1). 
 240.  Spence, supra note 87, at 80–81. 
 241.  In discussing the costs and benefits of expanding rape law to include coercion and fraud, 
Professor Falk notes that one potential cost is trivializing the experience of violent rape.  Falk, Rape, 
supra note 59, at 143.  She also notes, however, that “statutes [that] grade violent rape more harshly 
and punish it more severely[] preserv[e] the judgment that it is a qualitatively more serious offense 
and forestall[] any possible hint of trivialization.”  Id. at 150.  After discussing the considerations 
related to expanding rape law to include coercion and fraud, she concludes the benefits outweigh the 
costs.  Id. at 156.  
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more of “gentle nudge” rather than a “hard shove.” 
2. Applying the Blended, Incremental Approach 
Applying the approach proposed in this Comment helps to demonstrate 
its benefits as well as identify its drawbacks.  Assuming the facts in Brooks, 
the outcome under the approach proposed in this Comment would likely be 
the same as under the highly subjective standard, but the analysis in reaching 
that result would differ. 
Specifically, the analysis would begin by determining whether the threat 
was within any of the context-specific circumstances.  During the trial, J.P. 
testified that she did not believe she would be fired or suffer direct adverse 
employment consequences as a result of the affair being exposed, but she did 
not want it exposed and believed it would taint the workplace 
environment.
242
  Thus, the threat would not fall within the category of a 
threat to inflict substantial economic or financial harm or the category of a 
threat to expose information tending to substantially impair the credit or 
business repute of a person.  Further, Brooks did not threaten to accuse J.P. 
of failure to comply with immigration regulations or to take or withhold 
action in an official capacity.
243
  As a result, Brooks’s conduct would not fall 
within one of the context-specific circumstances in which there would be a 
rebuttable presumption that J.P. had no reasonable alternative, and thus, the 
threat was illegal and coercive. 
Unlike the proposed MPC statute, however, the analysis would not stop 
here.  Rather, it would be necessary to consider if Brooks made emotional, 
psychological, intellectual, or moral threats that left J.P. with no reasonable 
alternative but to engage in the sex act.  Whether J.P. had a reasonable 
alterative would be considered from a subjective and objective perspective.  
In both instances, the analysis would be focused on whether the alternative is 
reasonable.  Even if there were other alternatives, were they reasonable?  
Subjectively, the analysis would be similar to the court’s analysis in Brooks.  
J.P. testified that she believed Brooks would follow through with his threat if 
she did not comply, and she only had sex because of this threat.
244
  One of 
J.P.’s 
alternatives would have been refusing to have sex and having Brooks 
expose the affair.  Subjectively and objectively, however, this is arguably 
                                                          
 242.  State v. Brooks, 265 P.3d 1175, 1180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d 317 P.3d 54 (Kan. 2014). 
 243.  Id.  
 244.  Id. 
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not a reasonable alternative.  Rather, Brooks put J.P. in a situation of 
choosing between an unreasonable threat and an unreasonable alternative, 
and thus, his threat was illegal and coercive. 
As a result, applying the appellate standard of review—”review[ing] the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a 
rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt”
245
—it seems likely the same result would be reached 
under the approach proposed in this Comment as under the highly subjective 
standard.  Brooks would be guilty of rape.  It also seems likely that the jury 
that originally found Brooks guilty rape would similarly find Brooks guilty 
of rape by nonphysical coercion. 
While the outcomes would likely be the same under both approaches, 
the analysis leading to the result would differ as demonstrated above.  Under 
the highly subjective standard, no consideration was given to J.P.’s 
alternatives—the only question was whether J.P. was subjectively overcome 
by fear.  The more nuanced approach outlined here takes into account 
additional factors—was the threat of a type where it was more likely to be 
coercive and did the victim have reasonable alternatives.  These further 
considerations help narrow the scope of the broad and over-inclusive highly 
subjective standard. 
Consider again the list of other potential threats that could be criminal 
under the highly subjective standard as discussed in Part III.A.2: 
[A] police officer’s threat to arrest or offer not to make a justifiable 
arrest; a job supervisor’s intention to fire an employee, block a 
promotion, or expedite an undeserved promotion; a threat to expose 
another person’s adultery, embezzlement, irregular immigration status, 
or sexual orientation; a wealthy person’s threat to stop supporting a 
paramour; [or] a person’s threat to break off a dating 
relationship . . . .
246
 
Under the highly subjective standard of Brooks, a defendant could be 
guilty of rape if the victim was overcome by fear due to any of these threats.  
The approach proposed in this Comment will not definitively classify a 
threat as permissible or impermissible—nor should it—but it will provide a 
more detailed framework within which to analyze and distinguish between 
legal—albeit morally suspect—threats and illegal threats. 
                                                          
 245.  State v. Brooks, 317 P.3d 54, 65 (Kan. 2014). 
 246.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1) cmt., at 70. 
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3. Reflecting on the Proposed Approach 
The approach outlined in this Comment takes into account many of the 
issues identified with other alternatives and would provide Kansas with a 
more clearly defined standard that would lead to more predictable results 
and better guide behavior.  It is not, however, the only acceptable approach 
to criminalizing rape by nonphysical coercion, and it has its own 
shortcomings.  Nonetheless, “[t]he law must [ultimately] choose, from 
among empirically imperfect standards, the one best able to guide behavior 
and minimize the cost of inevitable over- and under-inclusiveness.”
247
  The 
proposed approach is an attempt to do just this. 
The dual-approach to criminalizing rape by nonphysical coercion—
including context-specific circumstances as well as a general category 
criminalizing nonphysical coercion—would provide for greater certainty and 
minimize the potential for the law to be over-inclusive.  By enumerating 
specific limited circumstances where there would be rebuttal presumption 
that the threat was coercive and illegal, the law outlines situations where 
there is a higher likelihood of a coercive threat.  This would not only assist 
the fact finder in analyzing a particular case, but would also put people on 
notice as to unacceptable criminal actions and better guide behavior. 
Further, considering whether the threatened individual was left with no 
reasonable alternative but to engage in the sex act from both a subjective and 
objective perspective would limit the potential over-inclusiveness of the 
law—an issue with many of the alternatives discussed in this Comment.  
Neither the statute proposed in the draft MPC nor the highly subjective 
standard provides limits on the scope of threats that could be criminal.  If an 
individual was “overcome by fear” due to her boyfriend’s threats to break up 
with her, should his threats be criminal?  Should a threat to “expose any 
information tending to impair the credit or business repute of any person” be 
criminal without a de minimis threshold?
248
 
While many people would likely respond “no” to both of the questions 
above, requiring that the threatened person was left with no reasonable 
alterative may be controversial.  The other party making the threat put 
himself or herself in the wrong by making the threat.  Why should the 
threatened person be required to prove there were no reasonable 
alternatives?  Considering several of the hypothetical threats, however, 
                                                          
 247.  Id. § 213.2(1)(a) cmt., at 47. 
 248.  MPC DRAFT, supra note 1, § 213.4(1)(a)(ii), at 69 (emphasis added); see also supra note 
224 and accompanying text. 
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illustrates that the analysis is not so simple.  Interpersonal relationships are 
complex.  What crosses the line from persuasion to coercion is not always 
clear.  Categorically criminalizing threats, without examining the broader 
circumstances would be unwise.  Considering the reasonable alternatives 
helps define at what point the behavior crosses the line to being illegal. 
Finally, in an effort to strike the balance between appropriately 
criminalizing coercive threats, while not being over-inclusive, the approach 
inevitably becomes more complex.  The analysis would require 
consideration of both the context-specific circumstances and the general 
category.  Further, in all instances, the fact finder would need to consider 
whether the threatened individual had a reasonable alternative from both 
subjective and objective perspective.  This complexity, however, is what 
would allow the law the better define unacceptable, coercive behavior and 
also limit the potential for over-inclusiveness. 
Reasonable scholars, commentators, and practitioners will disagree over 
how to best define the parameters of the law.  While the approach proposed 
in this Comment has its own shortcomings, it addresses many of the 
drawbacks of potential alternatives.  Further, not only would the proposed 
approach provide Kansas with a more clearly defined standard, it also offers 
another available option to be considered, discussed, and refined as the law 
continues to evolve. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rape by nonphysical coercion should be criminalized.  The challenge 
for the law, however, is how to define what behavior constitutes rape by 
nonphysical coercion.  When does a person’s conduct cross the line from 
permissible persuasion, or even a morally suspect, but arguably legal threat, 
to illegal coercion?  The highly subjective standard of Brooks does little to 
help define this point, but rather provides an unclear standard that could lead 
to a lack of predictable results and an over-criminalization of conduct. 
This Comment analyzed approaches taken in states that criminalize rape 
by nonphysical coercion and alternatives presented by scholars.  Considering 
the benefits, but also the critiques of the various approaches, this Comment 
proposed a blended, incremental approach to criminalizing rape by 
nonphysical coercion.  This approach would provide Kansas with a more 
clearly defined standard that would lead to more predictable results, better 
guide behavior, and more appropriately balance the ongoing challenge of 
being neither too over- or under-inclusive. 
 
